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ABSTRACT 
Digital sampling is never accidental. It frequently occurs in the context of 
the music industry. Some even propose that the process is essential to the 
industry. Yet, what this assertion fails to appreciate is that regardless of the 
subjectively-perceived essential nature of digital sampling, it is often the 
unlawful appropriation of another’s copyrighted work. While some 
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jurisdictions dismiss these claims as de minimis, the illegal nature of digital 
sampling does not dissipate merely because some court deems it trivial. It 
remains the intentional, unlawful appropriation of another’s copyrighted 
work.  
The Sixth Circuit proposed a bright-line rule whereby any digital 
sampling, no matter how trivial, is per se copyright infringement. This per 
se rule is a deviation from the generally accepted de minimis exception that 
traditionally applies to copyright infringement actions. So, what justified 
the Sixth Circuit’s deviation? The Sixth Circuit rested its holding on the fact 
that digital sampling requires the intentional unlawful appropriation of 
another’s copyrighted work. While other copyright infringements might 
also be intentional, it is not a prerequisite. Digital sampling, on the other 
hand, cannot be performed without such an intent.  
When addressed with the identical issue, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
implement the Sixth Circuit’s per se rule. The Ninth Circuit, like its Sixth 
Circuit counterpart, analyzed and interpreted the relevant statutes, yet 
reached a discordant conclusion. What is interesting, though, is the 
emphasis the Ninth Circuit placed on the formal principles of logic. Therein 
lies the problem. Canons of statutory interpretation require a judicial 
determination of the drafter’s intent. While dependence upon the formal 
principles of logic has a certain charm, it may presuppose an unreliable 
premise, leading to a potential distortion of the drafter’s true intent.  
Thus, the two circuits to address the issue of digital sampling and 
copyrighted sound recordings have reached inherently incompatible 
conclusions, resulting in a circuit split. This Note will argue that, despite the 
tradition of de minimis application to copyright infringement actions, the 
Sixth Circuit’s per se rule with respect to digital sampling and copyrighted 
sound recordings should prevail. This Note will evaluate both circuits’ 
holdings and the underlying rationale behind each. Furthermore, this Note 
will propose that, in economic terms, the overall utilitarian goal of 
American copyright law is best achieved by adopting the Sixth Circuit’s per 
se rule.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“It is a nice, tidy, ‘logical’ argument but so manifestly contrary to 
the purpose of the statute as to incite grave doubts, at least in 
judges who are not in thrall to the syllogistic style of legal 
reasoning.” 
− Richard Posner, Circuit Judge,  
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit1 
Two of America’s greatest music cities—Nashville and Los Angeles2—are 
irreparably at odds with one another with respect to the copyright 
protection afforded to copyrighted sound recordings. The inequality stems 
from the ever-prevalent use of digital sampling in the music industry. On 
the one hand, the Sixth Circuit held that any digital sampling of a 
copyrighted sound recording, no matter how trivial, is per se copyright 
infringement.3 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit held that with respect 
to copyrighted sound recordings, a de minimis exception applies.4 The 
conflict between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of the federal 
copyright statutes contradicts the purpose for including the Copyright 
Clause in the United States Constitution,5 leaving only two options for a 
final determination of the rights of copyright owners: Supreme Court 
resolution or congressional action.  
Because of the disparity between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, copyright 
owners in one geographic area are entitled to more protection than owners 
in another area, solely based upon their physical location.  This Note will 
analyze both the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. 
Ciccone. The premises of both will be examined within the context of the 
utilitarian foundation underlying all copyright protection and in 
accordance with the canons of statutory interpretation. Both interpretations 
will further be analyzed based upon their anticipated economic impact on 
the music industry.  Finally, this Note closes with the determination that the 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. In re Freedom Group, Inc., 50 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 2. Gianni Jaccoma, America’s 12 Greatest Music Cities, Ranked, THRILLIST (Feb. 14, 
2015), https://www.thrillist.com/travel/nation/best-cities-for-live-music-new-york-
memphis-asheville-and-austin.  
 3. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799-801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 4. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 5. See Joshua Crum, The Day the (Digital) Music Died: Bridgeport, Sampling 
Infringement, and a Proposed Middle Ground, B.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 950 (2008). 
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Sixth Circuit’s interpretation adequately advances the stated purpose of 
copyright protection.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Over two centuries ago, the people of the United States recognized the 
need for copyright protection and consequently granted the federal 
government authority to provide the desired protection. Predictably, such 
an accepted and necessary power finds its roots in the United States 
Constitution. In establishing copyright protection as a foundational 
principle of American law, the Constitution provides Congress with the 
authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”6 The inclusion of this power was 
more than passively approved; it was, instead, perceived as so inherent that 
it was “scarcely questioned.”7  
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Copyright Protection 
Before plunging into the specifics of the statutory creature that is 
copyright protection, it is necessary to evaluate the underlying theory for 
copyright protection. The predominant theory justifying copyright 
protection is utilitarianism.8 Utilitarianism is “the philosophical and 
economic doctrine that the best social policy is that which does the most 
good for the greatest number of people.”9 This doctrine, as the primary 
justification for copyright protection, is not unique to American copyright 
jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                                                      
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The utility of this power will scarcely be 
questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a 
right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the 
inventors.”) See also ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A 
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 24 (2010) (“The vote on the Copyright Clause 
was not accompanied by any recorded debate at the Constitutional Convention, and it was 
approved unanimously.”). Note, however, that some attribute this unanimous approval to 
the fact that the Framers desired the United States to be “culturally competitive” and the 
intellectual property clause included therein was “an afterthought,” resulting in the clause 
receiving “less thought than perhaps [it] should have.” Id. (citing Edward C. Walterscheid, 
To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 
43 IDEA 1, 9 (2002)). 
 8. See KWALL, supra note 7, at 23.  
 9. Utilitarianism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
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In 1710, England passed the Statute of Anne,10 which displaced the then-
current copyright protection and reflected a theoretical shift.11 The stated 
purpose of the Statute of Anne was “for the Encouragement of Learning, by 
Vesting the Copies . . . in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during 
the Times therein mentioned.”12 Thus, copyright protection was no longer 
justified under natural law, but instead sought to promote the general 
welfare through encouraging learning.13 Prior to the passage of the Statute 
of Anne, however, copyright owners enjoyed a perpetual copyright (in other 
words, an indefinite monopoly),14 which was illustrative of a natural law 
approach. The Statute of Anne “represented a radical theoretical shift” in 
that it limited the previously perpetual copyright to fourteen years with the 
possibility of a single renewal.15 By limiting the duration of ownership and 
protection, the Statute of Anne implicitly rejected the notion that 
intellectual property was regarded as a natural right in the same manner as 
real or traditional personal property.16  
The utilitarian concept of encouraging learning, as opposed to protecting 
artistic integrity, is also illustrated in Article I of the United States 
Constitution.17 American copyright law provides an economic incentive in 
the form of a limited monopoly to the owner of the copyright for the 
purposes of promoting what is best for the American people.18 By its own 
stated purpose, “the Copyright Clause carefully eschews any embrace of a 
natural-law or labor theory of intellectual property—a fact made all the 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Statute of Anne 1710, 9 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).   
 11. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 18 (2011). 
 12. Statute of Anne 1710, 9 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).   
 13. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 18 (“The seemingly irrepressible Lockean logic 
therefore held that by putting labor into their intellectual creations, authors automatically 
earned a natural property right in their works. This right was perpetual, just like the right to 
real property or chattel . . . .”). 
 14. Id. at 17-18.  
 15. Id. at 18.  
 16. See KWALL, supra note 7, at 25 (“Natural law theory, particularly as developed by 
John Locke, espouses the God-given right to acquire external things, either through exerting 
labor or by initial possession, and to dispose of such items as desired.”).  
 17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that the purpose of federal copyright 
protection is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). 
 18. See KWALL, supra note 7, at 23 (“[T]he primary objective of our copyright law is to 
ensure the copyright owner’s receipt of all financial rewards to which [one] is entitled by 
virtue of copyright ownership.”). See also NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 
5 (2008) (“Copyright law accomplishes [its] objective most obviously by providing an 
economic incentive for the creation and dissemination of numerous works of authorship.”).   
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more remarkable by the rather heavy influence of Lockean hermeneutics on 
the Framers.”19  
Furthermore, the rationale behind the natural law theory relating to real 
and personal property does not always correlate with the principles of 
intellectual property.20 For example,  
If I allow you to use my car, I am necessarily deprived of its use. 
But although someone’s unauthorized use of my words or 
musical notes may damage me in some way (whether economic 
or moral), it does not deprive me of the continued use of those 
words or musical notes.21  
Thus, in opposition to the Lockean hermeneutics22 of a God-given right to 
acquire and dispose, the statutory creation serves its utilitarian end by 
providing authors economic incentives.   
B. The Statutory Development of American Copyright Protection 
As with many foundations of the American legal system, the United 
States’ version of copyright protection was an extension of English law.23 
Following England’s Statute of Anne—known as “the world’s first ‘modern’ 
copyright act”24—and pursuant to the Constitution, on May 31, 1790, 
President George Washington signed into effect the Copyright Act of 
1790.25 As demands changed and technology evolved, copyright protection 
underwent two significant changes: the Copyright Act of 190926 and the 
current law, the Copyright Act of 1976.27 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 19.  
 20. TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 20 (“[T]he peculiar characteristic of intellectual 
property . . . is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. . . 
. [T]he natural-law theories that rationalize the protection of physical property may not 
entirely translate to the realm of intellectual property.”).  
 21. Id. 
 22. The term “Lockean” refers to “John Locke’s justification of private property, based 
on the natural right of one’s ownership of one’s own labor, and the right to nature’s common 
property to the extent that one’s labor can make use of it.” Lockean labor theory, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The term hermeneutics means “[t]he art of interpreting 
texts, esp. as a technique used in critical legal studies.” Hermeneutics, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 23. TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 17.  
 24. TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 17.  
 25. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.  
 26. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.  
 27. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, October 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541.  
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The Copyright Act of 1976 was codified under Title 17 of the United 
States Code. Under the current law, copyright protection covers “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”28 
including sound recordings.29 Notably, in addressing an inherent problem 
with the Copyright Act of 1909, Section 102 extends protection to mediums 
that have not yet been developed.30 Combine the practice of extending 
copyright protection to mediums that have not yet been developed with the 
shift from protection at publication31 to protection at creation32 and the 
result evinces the congressional intent to provide a wide range of protection 
to copyright owners.  
Moreover, Section 106, which elaborates on the general provisions of 
Section 102, provides the owner of a copyrighted material with a bundle of 
exclusive rights.33 The first and most important exclusive right is the right 
“to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”34 The right 
to reproduce is at the heart of American copyright jurisprudence. Another 
exclusive right within the copyright owner’s bundle is the right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”35 The remaining 
exclusive rights in the copyright owner’s bundle are the rights to distribute, 
perform, and display the copyrighted work.36  
However, these so-called “exclusive rights” are not absolute.37 Section 114 
modifies the scope of the exclusive rights in sound recordings.38 For 
example, the exclusive rights to reproduce and prepare derivative works “do 
not extend to the making or duplicating of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though 
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).   
 29. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 30. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 31. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. 
 32. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541. 
 33. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154). 
 34. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 35. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154). See also 17 
U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154) (“A derivative work is a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”) (internal quotations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  
 36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3)-(6) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 37. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154) (stating that the 
exclusive rights outlined are “[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122”).  
 38. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154). 
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recording.”39 Therefore, assuming Jimi Hendrix’s iconic rendition of the 
Star-Spangled Banner at Woodstock in 1969 is a copyrighted sound 
recording, it would not be copyright infringement for another musician to 
duplicate that performance.40 
C. Digital Sampling and Sound Recordings  
Music, as a useful art, is protected by copyright in two separate and 
distinct ways. First, protection extends to “musical works, including any 
accompanying words”41—i.e., the sheet music, or composition, and the 
accompanying lyrics, autonomous from any recording.42 Second, the 
“sound recordings” are protected as well.43 A sound recording is a term of 
art, referring to “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, 
spoken, or other sounds,”44 or, in other words, the actual recording of the 
artist performing the aforementioned musical work. It is not necessary for 
the same person to hold both copyrights. Simply stated, 
[A] songwriter can write a song as sheet music having notes for 
instruments and voices, possibly with lyrics, to form a 
copyrighted musical work. A band’s recording of the song would 
be a copyrighted sound recording. The musical work and sound 
recording owners may not be the same entity; the songwriter 
may own the musical work, while the band, the producer, or a 
record company may own the sound recording.45  
                                                                                                                                      
 39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154) (emphasis 
added).  
 40. For a recorded version of Jimi Hendrix’s performance, see Kylegood101, Jimi 
Hendrix-Star Spangled Banner at Woodstock, YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKvnQYFhGCc.  
 41. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 42. See James A. Johnson, Thou Shall Not Steal: A Primer on Music Licensing, 80-JUN 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 23, 23 (2008); see also Crum, supra note 5, at 950.  
 43. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154). See also 
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (amending 
“title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound 
recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of 
sound recording, and for other purposes”). 
 44. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 45. Mark R. Carter, Applying the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test to Musical-Work 
and Sound-Recording Infringement: Correcting the Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films Legacy, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 676 (2013). See also Crum, supra note 5, at 950 
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Furthermore, sampling refers to the process whereby someone who is 
not the copyright owner of a sound recording takes a previously 
copyrighted sound recording and uses it to create some other recording.46 
Digital sampling is merely a type of sampling through the use of a 
computer.47 This process of sampling sound recordings has led to numerous 
disputes in the music industry. Some of the more recent disputes involve 
Jay-Z,48 Led Zeppelin,49 and Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke.50 While 
the use of sampling is most prevalent in hip-hop music,51 it “is certainly not 
just a hip-hop phenomenon. The practice is widely used throughout the 
music industry.”52 However, the prevalence of such a practice does nothing 
to combat the fact that sampling violates the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights.53  
                                                                                                                                      
(“Under standard industry recording contracts, most artists surrender their sound recording 
copyrights to the record company that releases the performance.”). 
 46. See Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh My!: How Hip Hop 
Music is Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 843, 846 n.9 (2011) (“A sample is the portion of pre-existing sound 
recordings that producers use to create new compositions.”). 
 47. Johnson, supra note 42, at 23 (“Digital sampling is the recording of a sound 
recording or portion of a sound recording by means of a computer and then using that copy 
in a new sound recording.”). 
 48. See Rory Carroll, Jay Z Wins Copyright Infringement Case over Big Pimpin’ Egyptian 
Song Sample, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/oct/21/jay-z-wins-copyright-infringement-case-
big-pimpin-sample. 
 49. See Ben Sisario, Led Zeppelin’s ‘Stairway to Heaven’ to Be Scrutinized in Court in 
Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/business/media/led-zeppelins-stairway-to-heaven-to-
be-scrutinized-in-court-in-copyright-case.html. 
 50. See Associated Press, Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke to Pay $7.4m to Marvin 
Gaye’s Family over Blurred Lines, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/mar/10/blurred-lines-pharrell-robin-thicke-
copied-marvin-gaye. See also William Hochberg, Why the ‘Blurred Lines’ Disaster Won’t Be 
Reversed (Even if the Verdict Is), DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/09/12/blurred-lines-disaster-no-reversed/. 
 51. Evans, supra note 46, at 845-46 (“For decades hip hop producers have relied on the 
innovative use of existing recordings . . . . [as] the hallmark of the type of creativity and 
innovation born out of the hip hop music tradition.”).  
 52. Id. at 858.  
 53. For an entertaining justification and explanation on sampling in hip-hop music, see 
VanillaIceArchive, Vanilla Ice Explains Sampling (Ice Ice Baby – Queen/David Bowie), 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5V0Fx50ViI. For a reference 
to the context of the interview compare Queen Official, Queen – Under Pressure (Official 
Video), YOUTUBE (Sept. 9, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a01QQZyl-_I, with 
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Opponents to the “sampling is stealing” mindset, while conceding that 
the copyright laws require the sampling artist to obtain a license, argue that 
the current copyright laws fail “to acknowledge the historic role, informal 
norms and value of borrowing.”54 Note the use of the word “borrowing” as 
if the sampling artist is going to return what was appropriated. Intellectual 
property rights cannot be borrowed and subsequently returned in the same 
sense as traditional personal property because “borrowing” implies 
exclusive use.55  
Another argument advanced in opposition to the “sampling is stealing” 
mindset is that the record companies—who are typically transferred the 
rights to a copyrighted sound recording from the artist in an effort to 
promote and sell the recording—pursue these suits based on the perceived 
profitability and not the artistic integrity of the work.56 “Thus, while some 
artists may have no objection to being sampled, their record companies 
hold the final decision.”57 This argument fails to appreciate the benefit of 
copyright protection that vests in the owner, or transferred owner. The 
copyright statutes prohibit certain acts that violate the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights.58 The focus is on the act in light of the copyright, not the 
relationship between the owner and the copyrighted creation. Furthermore, 
protecting artistic integrity, while it may be an incidental result, is not the 
primary goal of copyright protection. Regardless of the individual who 
pursues the infringement action, sampling “poses the greatest danger to the 
musical profession because the musician is being replaced with himself.”59 
Sampling, therefore, by its very nature, is at odds with copyright protection.  
Finally, because most claims are settled out of court, very few sampling 
cases actually continue to trial.60 Settling out of court alleviates “the 
potential for injunctions on the sale of the underlying album or worse, 
                                                                                                                                      
vanillaiceVEVO, Vanilla Ice – Ice Ice Baby, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rog8ou-ZepE.  
 54. Evans, supra note 46, at 846.  
 55. TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 20. 
 56. Crum, supra note 5, at 950. 
 57. Id. at 950-51. 
 58. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 59. Christopher D. Abramson, Note, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician: A 
Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1668 (1999) (emphasis added).  
 60. See Rebecca Morris, Note, When Is A CD Factory Not Like A Dance Hall?: 
The Difficulty of Establishing Third-Party Liability for Infringing Digital Music 
Samples, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 274 (2000). See also Crum, supra note 
5, at 953. 
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criminal sanctions.”61 Until the Ninth Circuit’s holding in VMG Salsoul, 
LLC v. Ciccone, the sampling cases that actually reached trial were 
influenced by the “sampling is stealing” mindset.62 Now, however, because 
of the Ninth Circuit, there is an uneven enforcement of the law, which 
distorts the purpose of federal laws.63  
III.  THE CIRCUITS SEND CONTRADICTING MESSAGES 
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are sending antithetical messages as it 
relates to the level of protection afforded to copyright owners who allege 
infringement based upon the sampling of copyrighted sound recordings. At 
the outset, it is important to understand the key concept of the de minimis 
standard. De minimis is the colloquial maxim for the Latin phrase de 
minimis non curat lex, which translates to “the law does not concern itself 
with trifles.”64 “In essence, the de minimis use defense asserts [a] lack of 
substantial similarity.”65 It is this concept that served as the medium by 
which the Ninth Circuit justified its rejection of the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding.66 
                                                                                                                                      
 61. Crum, supra note 5, at 953. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 949.  
 64. Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for its Application in 
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 947 (2006) (citations omitted).  
 65. Carter, supra note 45, at 679.  
 66. While it is not part of the holding in either case, it is important at this juncture to 
briefly mention the corollary concept of fair use. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Since the district judge found no infringement, 
there was no necessity to consider the affirmative defense of ‘fair use.’ On remand, the trial 
judge is free to consider this defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these 
facts.”). The doctrine of fair use, with respect to copyright infringement, has been codified in 
Title 17 of the United States Code. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114-154).  Fair use is an affirmative defense to an infringement claim and thus, must be pled 
and proven by the defendant. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 
(1994) (stating that “fair use is an affirmative defense”). See also Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: 
An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 686-91 (2015).  The doctrine of fair use states 
that “reproduction . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154) (emphasis 
added). In determining whether fair use applies the following factors are to be considered:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, . . . ;   
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and  
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A. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films and the Sixth Circuit’s 
Bright-Line Rule 
In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, the Sixth Circuit 
established a bright-line rule for infringement claims based upon the digital 
sampling of copyrighted sound recordings.67 After examining the relevant 
statutes, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “a sound recording owner has the 
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”68 If that were not clear 
enough, the Sixth Circuit reiterated this point when it stated, “Get a license 
or do not sample.”69 
In Bridgeport Music, Bridgeport, along with a few other plaintiffs, 
effectuated a blitzkrieg-style attack on approximately 800 defendants, 
alleging nearly 500 claims of copyright infringement.70 Bridgeport and 
Westbound—the remaining plaintiffs—claimed to own, respectively, the 
musical composition and the sound recording copyrights of “Get Off Your 
Ass and Jam”71 (“Get Off”) by George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics.72 
“Get Off” was sampled in the rap song “100 Miles and Runnin’”73 (“100 
Miles”), which was included in the soundtrack to the movie I Got the Hook 
Up.74 The Sixth Circuit assumed, because the defendant did not deny it, that 
“100 Miles” included the allegedly infringed samples from “Get Off.”75 The 
contested sample stemmed from a three-note combination guitar solo that 
lasts for four seconds.76 The sampled portion of this solo, used in “100 
Miles,” was a two-second sample of the guitar solo, which was looped and 
                                                                                                                                      
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154). 
 67. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 795.   
 71. For a reference to the original copyrighted sound recording, see Larry Hinze, 
FUNKADELIC “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” 1975 HQ, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMiNDZNlPqc. 
 72. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 796. 
 73. For a version of “100 Miles and Runnin’,” see TheEasyEVEVO, N.W.A. – 100 Miles 
and Runnin’ (The Explicit), YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOw6-1kOwck.  
 74. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 796. For a trailer of the film I Got the Hook Up, 
see woluhar1, I Got the Hook Up (1998) Trailer, YOUTUBE (Jan. 21, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXBFBEWBy5E.  
 75. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 796. 
 76. Id. 
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extended for sixteen beats, appearing in five places throughout “100 
Miles.”77  
The district court “concluded that, whether the sampling is examined 
under qualitative/quantitative de minimis analysis or under the so-called 
‘fragmented literal similarity’ test, the sampling in this case did not ‘rise to 
the level of a legally cognizable appropriation.’”78 The district court listened 
to both songs—”Get Off” and “100 Miles”—and determined that “no 
reasonable juror, even one familiar with the works of George Clinton, 
would recognize the source of the sample without having been told of its 
source.”79 The “no reasonable juror” determination combined with the 
small amount sampled—a quantitative analysis—and the lack of similarity 
between the recordings—a qualitative analysis—resulted in the district 
court granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.80 The 
judgment was appealed not on the grounds that the district court 
mischaracterized the sample or that there was some genuine dispute as to a 
material fact but on the ground that “no substantial similarity or de minimis 
inquiry should be undertaken at all when the defendant has not disputed 
that it digitally sampled a copyrighted sound recording.”81 
Because the district court’s analysis mirrored the analysis required for an 
alleged infringement of a musical composition and not a sound recording, 
the Sixth Circuit ultimately reversed the district court.82 The Sixth Circuit 
stated that sound recordings should be analyzed differently than musical 
compositions.83 In support, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “[a]dvances 
in technology coupled with . . . the popularity of hip hop or rap music have 
made instances of digital sampling extremely common.”84 The Sixth Circuit 
further reasoned that the courts, as well as the music industry, are best 
served by a bright-line rule, one that “adds clarity to what constitutes 
actionable infringement with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted 
sound recordings.”85 If, however, the Sixth Circuit were to follow the 
                                                                                                                                      
 77. Id.   
 78. Id. at 797 (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 
841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)).  
 79. Id. at 798.  
 80. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 798. 
 81. Id.  
 82. See generally id. at 797-805.  
 83. Id. at 798.  
 84. Id. at 798-99.  
 85. Id. at 799.  
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musical composition analysis employed the district court, it would have 
reached the same result as the court below.86 
In forging a new path for copyrighted sound recordings, the Sixth Circuit 
began its analysis with many sections of Title 17 of the United States Code.87 
While outlining the general principles of Title 17, the Sixth Circuit relied 
primarily on 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), which pertains to the exclusive rights of 
owners of copyrighted sound recordings.88 Section 114(b) states, in relevant 
part, that  
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend 
to the making or duplication of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even 
though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted 
sound recording.89 
The Sixth Circuit found Section 114(b) of Title 17 particularly relevant 
because the Copyright Act of 1976 added the word “entirely,”90 whereas the 
Sound Recording Act of 1971 merely stated that “the right does not extend 
to the making or duplication of another sound recording that is an 
independent fixation of other sounds.”91 From this addition, the Sixth 
Circuit interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) as stating that “a sound recording 
owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”92  
In support of this bright-line rule, the Sixth Circuit laid out numerous 
reasons justifying its conclusion. First, there is the ease of enforcement 
without stifling creativity, because, from what is clear from the text of the 
statute, an artist may imitate the copyrighted sound recording.93 Second, 
“the market will control the license price and keep it within bounds.”94 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the court stated that  
                                                                                                                                      
 86. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 798 n.4. 
 87. Id. at 799-800.  
 88. Id. at 799-801. See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114-154).  
 89. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154) (emphasis 
added).  
 90. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800-01; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-553, 
Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541. 
 91. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391.  
 92. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
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[S]ampling is never accidental. It is not like the case of a 
composer who has a melody in his head, perhaps not even 
realizing that the reason he hears this melody is that it is the 
work of another which he had heard before. When you sample a 
sound recording you know you are taking another’s work 
product.95 
Fourth, the Sixth Circuit stated that adopting a de minimis standard or a 
substantial similarity analysis would require “mental, musicological, and 
technological gymnastics.”96 The Sixth Circuit, however, immediately 
qualified this statement by declaring that judicial economy is not the 
driving force behind the opinion.97 In recognition that its holding created a 
new rule, the Sixth Circuit stated that it “did not pull this interpretation out 
of thin air”98 and proceeded to list, inter alia, other statutory and economic 
justifications.99 In sum, with “no existing sound recording judicial 
precedents to follow”100 and through statutory interpretation, the Sixth 
Circuit established the bright-line rule that any digital sampling of a 
copyrighted sound recording, no matter how trivial, is per se copyright 
infringement.101  
B. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone and the Ninth Circuit’s De Minimis 
Interpretation 
Over a decade after the Sixth Circuit created the bright-line rule in 
Bridgeport Music, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended to 
maintain a de minimis exception for copyrighted sound recordings in 
enacting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).102 The Ninth Circuit’s holding “that the de 
minimis exception applies to actions alleging infringement of a copyright to 
                                                                                                                                      
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. at 802.  
 97. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 802. 
 98. Id. at 802-03.  
 99. Id. at 802-05.  
 100. Id. at 802.  
 101. Id. at 799-801.  
 102. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).  
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sound recordings”103 opposes the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line, per se rule. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit consciously created a circuit split.104 
VMG Salsoul centers around Madonna Louise Ciccone’s (colloquially 
known as “Madonna”) song “Vogue,”105 which the Ninth Circuit 
characterized as “a mega-hit dance song.”106 In VMG Salsoul, the plaintiff, 
VMG, sued Madonna, Shep Pettibone (the producer of “Vogue”), and 
several others.107 VMG alleged that when recording “Vogue,” Pettibone 
“copied a 0.23-second segment of horns from [VMG’s] earlier song, [‘Ooh I 
Love It’ (‘Love Break’)] and used a modified version of that snippet when 
recording [‘Vogue’].”108 The allegedly sampled horn hits appeared in two 
forms: a “single” horn hit and a “double” horn hit.109 In support of its claim, 
VMG submitted evidence that “Pettibone directed an engineer to introduce 
sounds from [‘Love Break’] into the recording of [‘Vogue’].”110  
The district court, in evaluating the case, applied the de minimis 
exception to the alleged infringement claim and granted the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgement.111 The Ninth Circuit couched the district 
court’s decision in terms of applying a “longstanding legal rule.”112 This so-
called “longstanding legal rule” is that even where a plaintiff has proven the 
allegations of actual copying, the infringement claim will fail if the copying 
was trivial.113 In other words, de minimis copying does not constitute 
copyright infringement.114  
                                                                                                                                      
 103. Id. at 887 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). See also id. at 874 (“We 
hold that the de minimis exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted 
sound recordings, just as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions.”). 
 104. Id. at 887.  
 105. Id. at 874. For version of “Vogue” by Madonna, see Madonna, Madonna – Vogue 
(video), YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuJQSAiODqI.  
 106. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 875. 
 107. Id. at 874.  
 108. Id. For a version of “Love Break,” see REREPROD JUSTFORFUNK, SALSOUL 
ORCHESTRA 1982 ooh i love it love break, YOUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9irkIvpoI-A.  
 109. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 875. The Ninth Circuit defined sampling as “the 
actual physical copying of sounds from an existing recording for use in a new recording, 
even if accomplished with slight modifications such as changes to pitch or tempo.” Id.  
 110. Id. at 877.  
 111. Id. at 874.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
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1. The Majority’s Application of the De Minimis Non Curat Lex 
Standard 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with its own precedent established 
in Newton v. Diamond, reiterating that “to establish its infringement claim, 
[the plaintiff] must show that the copying was greater than de minimis.”115 
The Ninth Circuit, however, admitted that Newton dealt with a copyrighted 
musical composition, not a copyrighted sound recording.116 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that whether the de minimis exception applied to 
copyrighted sound recordings was an “open question.”117 
Although the court, in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, determined that the sound recording was sampled, the Ninth 
Circuit, nonetheless, concluded that the copying was de minimis.118 The 
Ninth Circuit justified this “as a matter of law” conclusion on the facts that 
the sampled portion lasted less than one-second, only occurred a few times, 
and was otherwise modified before being inserted into the new song.119 The 
court also noted a “quirk” in the case in that the plaintiff’s expert first 
misidentified the source of the sampled double horn hit.120  
Despite the conclusion that the copying was de minimis, VMG insisted 
that this conclusion was immaterial and argued that the de minimis 
exception did not apply to copyrighted sound recordings based upon the 
Sixth Circuit’s determination in Bridgeport Music.121 In response, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that the de minimis exception is firmly established in the law 
                                                                                                                                      
 115. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 877. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 877-78. 
 118. Id. at 880 (“After listening to the audio recordings submitted by the parties, we 
conclude that a reasonable juror could not conclude that an average audience would 
recognize the appropriation of the horn hit.”). 
 119. Id.  
 120. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 880 (“[A] highly qualified and trained musician 
listened to the recordings with the express aim of discerning which parts of the song had 
been copied, and he could not do so accurately. An average audience would not do a better 
job.”). 
 121. Id. Furthermore,    
[I]t seems like the only way to infringe on a sound recording is to re-record 
sounds from the original work, which is exactly the nature of digital sound 
sampling. Then the only issue becomes whether the defendant re-recorded 
sound from the original. This suggests that the substantial similarity test is 
inapplicable to sound recordings. 
Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the American Music Industry: 
Piracy or Just A Bad “Rap”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 896 (1992). 
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and, based upon the leading treatise, can be traced back to the mid-1800s.122 
The Ninth Circuit also stated that no other courts outside of the Sixth 
Circuit have applied Bridgeport Music’s per se rule.123 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the de minimis exception applies, unless there is 
some evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.124  
In order to evaluate Congress’s intent, the Ninth Circuit first looked to 
the relevant statutes, specifically 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, and 114(b), and 
determined that there was no indication from the text of the statutes to 
indicate a differing treatment for copyrighted sound recordings.125 Next, the 
Ninth Circuit looked to the legislative history and specifically quoted House 
Report No. 94-1476,126 which states, in relevant part, that  
[I]nfringement takes place whenever all or any substantial 
portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted 
sound recording are reproduced . . . . Mere imitation of a 
recorded performance would not constitute a copyright 
infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out to 
simulate another’s performance as exactly as possible.127 
Based upon this report, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not 
intend to expand the rights of a copyright owner with respect to sound 
recordings.128 The Ninth Circuit also concluded from the “any substantial 
portion” part of the House Report that Congress intended for a de minimis 
exception to apply.129 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected Bridgeport Music’s interpretation of 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106 and 114(b) for two additional reasons. The first was on the 
grounds that Bridgeport Music wrongfully inferred an expansion of 
protection from a section of the Code that limited the rights of copyright 
owners.130 The second was on the premise the Sixth Circuit’s holding 
constituted a logical fallacy.131 With regards to the Sixth Circuit’s logical 
fallacy, Bridgeport Music determined that because copyright protection for 
                                                                                                                                      
 122. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 880. 
 123. Id. at 881.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 881-83.  
 126. Id. at 883.  
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5721.  
 128. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
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sound recordings does not extend to other recordings made of entirely 
independent sounds, it does extend to other recordings that are not made of 
entirely independent sounds.132 The Ninth Circuit discredited Bridgeport 
Music’s holding by stating that “[a] statement that rights do not extend to a 
particular circumstance does not automatically mean that the rights extend 
to all other circumstances. In logical terms, it is a fallacy to infer the inverse 
of a conditional from the conditional.”133  
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended to maintain 
the de minimis exception for copyrighted sound recordings.134 The Ninth 
Circuit consciously created a circuit split, but, nonetheless justified its 
determination because “the goal of avoiding a circuit split cannot override 
our independent duty to determine congressional intent.”135 The Ninth 
Circuit reinforced its creation of a circuit split because the leading copyright 
treatise criticized the Bridgeport Music decision and because a circuit split 
already existed since no courts outside of the Sixth Circuit were 
implementing Bridgeport Music’s per se rule.136 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the de minimis exception applies to copyrighted sound 
recordings.137 
                                                                                                                                      
 132. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 133. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884. The Ninth Circuit also provided a helpful 
analogy to emphasize its point.  
For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has rained, then the grass 
is not dry.” It does not necessary follow that “if it has not rained, then the grass 
is dry.” Someone may have watered the lawn, for instance. We cannot infer the 
second if-then statement from the first. The first if-then statement does not tell 
us anything about the condition of the grass if it has not rained.  
Id. at 885.  
 134. Id. at 886.  
 135. Id. The Ninth Circuit felt justified in its conclusion despite the fact that three years 
earlier it stated,  
[T]he creation of a circuit split would be particularly troublesome in the realm 
of copyright. Creating inconsistent rules among the circuits would lead to 
different levels of protection in different areas of the country, even if the same 
alleged infringement is occurring nationwide. 
Id. (quoting Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th 
Cir. 2013)).   
 136. Id. (“Although we are the first circuit court to follow a different path than 
Bridgeport’s, we are in well-charted territory.”). 
 137. Id. at 874. 
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2. The Dissent: Coming to the Defense of Bridgeport Music 
The dissent began by characterizing a copyrighted sound recording as 
“the stock-in-trade” of artists, then characterized sampling as the physical 
and unlawful use of another’s property.138 After defining these terms of art, 
the dissent, without mincing words, stated, “In any other context, this 
would be called theft. It is no defense to theft that the thief made off with 
only a ‘de minimis’ part of the victim’s property.”139 The dissent proceeded 
to criticize the majority for its holding based upon a treatise, rather than the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music.140 The dissent acknowledged—
like the majority—that after the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Newport that the 
question of whether the de minimis exception applies to copyrighted sound 
was an “open question.”141 It was the dissent’s view, however, that the Sixth 
Circuit in Bridgeport Music answered this question.142  
And just exactly what is the Sixth Circuit’s radical holding in 
[Bridgeport Music] that the majority finds so distasteful? It’s this: 
if you want to use an identical copy of a portion of a copyrighted 
fixed sound recording—we’re not taking about “substantially 
similar” tunes or rhythms, but an actual identical copy of a sound 
that has already been recorded in a fixed medium—get a 
license.143  
The dissent began with the text of the relevant statutes.144 Based on 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106 and 114, the dissent reiterated that the owner of a copyrighted 
sound recording has the exclusive right to sample their own recording.145 In 
other words, it is the owner of the copyright and no one else, who may 
legally sample the copyrighted work.146 This right, however, is not 
                                                                                                                                      
 138. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 888 (Silverman, J. dissenting).  
 139. Id. But see TEHRANIAN, supra note 11, at 20 (discussing the inherent differences 
between physical property and intellectual property).  
 140. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 888 (Silverman, J. dissenting) (characterizing the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding as “a decision that has governed the music industry in Nashville—
’Music City’—and elsewhere for over a decade without causing either the sky to fall in, or 
Congress to step in.”).  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 888 (Silverman, J. dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 888-89.  
 145. Id. at 888.  
 146. Id.  
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absolute.147 It is qualified by 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) which, in relevant part, 
states that the exclusive rights of a copyright owner “do not extend to . . . 
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of 
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the 
copyrighted sound recording.”148 Thus, the dissent concluded that the Sixth 
Circuit’s interpretation of the statute was accurate.149 The dissent then 
characterized the majority’s logical fallacy argument as a “rhetorical 
exercise” that distorted the plain meaning of the statute when all provisions 
are read together.150 “That right,” the dissent explained, “was not invented 
by the Sixth Circuit: it already exists in the statutes,”151 statutes that make no 
mention of a de minimis exception, especially in the context of 
exclusivity.152  
Mirroring the Sixth Circuit, the dissent further emphasized the 
differences between sound recordings and musical compositions.153 The 
dispositive difference, according to the dissent, is that when someone 
infringes upon the copyrighted sound recording, it is more than an 
intellectual taking.154 It is a physical one.155 The dissent supported this 
distinction by stating that it is not only the song that is appropriated, but it 
is also the medium in which the artist chose to fix the recording.156 “This is 
unlike indiscernible photographs used, not for their content (which cannot 
be made out), but to dress a movie set.”157 The appropriation of both the 
                                                                                                                                      
 147. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 148. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154). See also VMG 
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 888 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J. dissenting) (“In 
other words, the world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the 
recording (like a tribute band, for example) so long as an actual copy of the sound recording 
itself is not made.”). 
 149. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 888-89 (Silverman, J. dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 888.  
 151. Id. at 889.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 889 (Silverman, J. dissenting).  
 155. Id. See also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“[S]ampling is never accidental. . . . When you sample a sound recording you know 
you are taking another’s work product.”). 
 156. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 889 (Silverman, J. dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 889.  
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recording and the medium “makes a de minimis analysis inapplicable, since 
sampling or pirating necessarily involves copying a fixed performance.”158 
Finally, the dissent pointed to the congressional inaction in the wake of 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music, and the benefits of 
Bridgeport Music’s functional, dependable, and easily ascertainable bright-
line rule.159 The dissent noted that Congress has taken no action in response 
to the Bridgeport Music ruling, despite the clear invitation from the Sixth 
Circuit to act if its interpretation was in error.160 “While it’s true that 
congressional inaction in the face of judicial interpretation is not ironclad 
evidence of [congressional] approval, it’s not chopped liver either.”161 
In the final paragraph, the dissent aptly summarized and concluded by 
stating 
True, Get a license or do not sample doesn’t carry the same divine 
force as Thou Shall Not Steal, but it’s the same basic idea. I would 
hold that the de minimis exception does not apply to the 
sampling, copying, stealing, pirating, misappropriation—call it 
what you will—of copyrighted fixed sound recordings. Once the 
sound is fixed, it is tangible property belonging to the copyright 
holder, and no one else has the right to take even a little of it 
without permission.162  
IV.  INTERPRETATION OR IMPLEMENTATION:  
THE BATTLE OF THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION  
Following the Ninth Circuit’s determination, only two circuits have 
addressed the narrow issue of whether a de minimis exception applies to 
infringement actions based upon the digital sampling of copyrighted sound 
recordings. In answering this question, both circuits examined the same 
statutes and addressed similar factual scenarios, and yet, the two reached 
inherently conflicting conclusions.  
                                                                                                                                      
 158. Id. “The defendants wanted horns to punctuate their song, so they took the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted recording of horns. The horn hit is brief, but clearly perceptible and 
does its job.” Id.   
 159. Id. at 889-90.  
 160. Id. at 889. See also Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 805. 
 161. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 889 (Silverman, J. dissenting) (internal citation 
omitted).  
 162. Id. at 890.  
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Both circuits agree that imitating a copyrighted sound recording is not 
copyright infringement provided that no actual copying was done.163 This 
agreement directly derives from the third sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), 
which states that  
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 [i.e., the 
exclusive rights to reproduce and prepare derivative works] do 
not extend to the making or duplication of another sound 
recording that consist entirely of an independent fixation of 
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those 
in the copyrighted sound recording.164   
What is interesting, though, is the similarity in the language used by both 
circuits. The Sixth Circuit stated that there is no infringement “so long as an 
actual copy of the sound recording itself is not made,”165 while the Ninth 
Circuit stated that there is no infringement “so long as there was no actual 
copying.”166 In Bridgeport, the Sixth Circuit assumed, because it was not 
denied, that there was actual copying, and held that there was 
infringement.167 In VMG Salsoul, however, the Ninth Circuit, for the 
purposes of summary judgment, also assumed that there was actual 
copying, but held that there was no infringement.168 By its own 
interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), the Ninth Circuit stated that there is 
not infringement “so long as there was no actual copying,”169 implying that 
there is infringement where there is actual copying. The Ninth Circuit did 
not interpret 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) as stating that there is only infringement so 
                                                                                                                                      
 163. See VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883 (majority opinion) (“A new recording that 
mimics the copyrighted recording is not an infringement, even if the mimicking is very well 
done, so long as there was no actual copying.”) (emphasis added); Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 
F.3d at 800 (“This means that the world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative 
work fixed in the recording so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not 
made.”) (emphasis added). Note the similarity in the language used by both circuits in 
reaching this agreement.  
 164. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 165. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800.  
 166. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883.  
 167. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 796, 805. 
 168. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 877, 887.  
 169. Id. at 883 (emphasis added). 
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long as there something more than de minimis copying; instead, it spoke in 
definite terms.170 
In any event, the circuits reached incompatible conclusions by relying 
upon what each deemed a natural reading of the text of the statute.171 After 
examining the relevant statutes, the Sixth Circuit concluded that because 
one cannot sample the entire recording, one cannot sample “something less 
than whole.”172 In the Sixth Circuit’s view, the major justification for this 
conclusion stems from the language that Congress used and the subtle 
differences between the Sound Recording Act of 1971 and the Copyright 
Act of 1976.173 In sum, the Sixth Circuit based its conclusion on several 
practical reasons, discussed above,174 and on the purpose of copyright 
protection: “to strike a balance between protecting original works and 
stifling further creativity.”175  
The Ninth Circuit not only examined the relevant statutes, but also relied 
heavily upon outside sources to support its conclusion. The Ninth Circuit 
relied primarily on the “leading copyright treatise,” Nimmer on Copyright.176 
The Ninth Circuit also relied upon dicta from one of its own previous cases, 
Newton v. Diamond, which the Ninth Circuit admitted did not address the 
issue presented in VMG Salsoul.177 In addition, the Ninth Circuit justified 
the de minimis exception on the premise that “[i]f the public does not 
recognize the appropriation, then the copier has not benefitted from the 
                                                                                                                                      
 170. Note that after the Ninth Circuit stated its interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), it 
went on to state that 
But the quoted passage [the third sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)] does not 
speak to the question that we face: whether Congress intended to eliminate the 
longstanding de minimis exception for sound recordings in all circumstances 
even where, as here, the new sound recording as a whole sounds nothing like 
the original.  
Id.  
 171. See id. at 883-84 (“That passage strongly supports the natural reading of § 114(b), 
discussed above.”) (emphasis added); Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 805 (“We have 
taken a literal reading approach.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
 172. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800. 
 173. Id. at 800-01.  
 174. See supra Part III.A.  
 175. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800. 
 176. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 880-85. Note that the Sixth Circuit used and cited 
other sources as well, but its reliance was not as prevalent as the Ninth Circuit’s.  
 177. See id. at 877-78 (stating that Newton does not answer the question presented and 
that “it is an open question in this circuit whether the [de minimis] exception applies to 
claims of infringement of a copyrighted sound recording”). See also id. at 881.  
2017] A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME 61 
 
original artist’s expressive content.”178 The Ninth Circuit further stated that 
even if there were some ambiguity in the text of the statute, the legislative 
history—again, something considered outside the text of the statute—
supported its conclusion.179 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
Sixth Circuit “ignored the statutory structure”180 of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) such 
that it inferred “an implicit expansion of rights into Congress’ statement of 
an express limitation on rights.”181 Finally, the Ninth Circuit, relying upon 
Nimmer’s analysis, stated that the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion was a logical 
fallacy.182 
A. Statutory Interpretation: Determining the Intent of Congress 
While there are some primary rules that courts utilize to interpret 
statutes, “there is no unified, systematic approach for unlocking meaning in 
all cases.”183 Regardless, the starting point for interpreting any statute is the 
text of the statute.184 “A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that 
courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, 
avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature 
was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’”185 The purpose 
                                                                                                                                      
 178. Id. at 881. Compare that statement with the Sixth Circuit’s characterization of 
sampling.  
[E]ven when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part taken is 
something of value. No further proof of that is necessary than the fact that the 
producer of the record or the artist on the record intentionally sampled because 
it would (1) save costs, or (2) add something to the new recording, or (3) both. 
For the sound recording copyright holder, it is not the “song” but the sounds 
that are fixed in the medium of his choice. When those sounds are sampled 
they are taken directly from that fixed medium. It is a physical taking rather 
than an intellectual one. 
Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801-02. Also, consider the idea that sampling “poses the 
greatest danger to the musical profession because the musician is being replaced with 
himself.” Abramson, supra note 59, at 1668.  
 179. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883-84 
 180. Id. at 884. 
 181. Id. at 883.  
 182. Id. at 884-85.  
 183. LARRY M. EIG, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT 
TRENDS, at Summary (2011).  
 184. Id. at 3.  
 185. Id. at 13 (internal citation omitted). See also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) 
(“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .”).  
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of this exercise is to ascertain the intent of Congress, which may also require 
examining the purpose of the statute.186 
Sometimes, unfortunately, examining the entirety of the statute is not 
enough. The statute may, nonetheless, remain ambiguous. Courts should be 
wary of “waving the wand of ambiguity” in order to serve some other 
political purpose. In other words, certain canons of interpretation can 
function as a “mere pretext because judges may pick and choose among 
them to achieve whatever result they desire.”187 If, in interpreting the 
statute, the court determines that some ambiguity exists, the court will then 
employ certain canons of interpretation.  
There are two main types of canons of interpretation: linguistic canons 
and substantive canons.188 Linguistic canons are “neutral, analytical guides 
for discerning the meaning of particular text that might otherwise appear 
unclear.”189 A substantive canon, on the other hand, “subordinates the 
general, linguistic canons of statutory construction, as well as other 
interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions, that unless rebutted, 
favor particular substantive results.”190 In interpreting statutes, courts may 
invoke either, both, or portions of each canon to interpret any given statute.  
1. Inferred Intent from the Provisions Set Forth in Title 17 
If a simple examination of the text of a statute fails to resolve the issue, 
then the court will attempt to ascertain the intent of Congress in enacting 
the statute. To determine congressional intent, the court should look to the 
purpose of the statute as well as the language and structure of the statute, 
                                                                                                                                      
 186. EIG, supra note 183, at 3. As Justice Jackson put it,  
However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative 
intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will 
construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general 
purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as 
the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the 
generally expressed legislative policy.  
SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).   
 187. EIG, supra note 183, at 5.  
 188. See generally id. at 4, 22.  
 189. Id. at 4. Linguistic canons are sometimes characterized to as a “textualist-based 
means of interpretation.” Id. at 1 (internal quotations omitted). “Textualism considers the 
law to be embodied in the language of the statute, as expressed in its plain meaning, which 
can be discerned through the aid, as necessary, of various judicially developed rules of 
interpretation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 190. Id. at 18. Substantive canons may be characterized as an “intentionalist-based means 
of interpretation [referring to] the Court’s approach toward relying on legislative history and 
other extrinsic considerations.” Id. at 1 (internal quotations omitted).  
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reading the entire statute as a harmonious whole. If this exercise proves 
futile, then different canons of interpretation may be used to assist the 
court.  
The intent of Congress, which is derived from the purpose, language, and 
structure of the statute, was, in the broadest context, to give effect to the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution.191 In giving effect to this provision of 
the Constitution, Congress sought to strike a balance between protecting 
original works of authorship and stifling creativity.192 By enacting the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and thereby eliminating the Copyright Act of 1909, 
Congress determined that to better balance the scales it was necessary to 
increase the protection afforded to copyright owners, thus illustrating the 
purpose of the copyright statute.193  
The structure of the copyright statute is a common structure used in 
many federal statutes: (1) define the terms; (2) state a broad, general rule; 
and (3) provide exceptions and limits to the broad, general rule. The 
language of the statute is simple. If any complexities exist, they are 
explained through either the definitions section, i.e., 17 U.S.C. § 101, or 
clarified by the context of the provision. Similarly, the intent of the 
copyright statute is clear. The statute was intended to increase protection 
afforded to copyright owners, which is verified through a simple 
comparison of the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976.194  
The Ninth Circuit opposed the Sixth Circuit, stating that sound 
recordings were not intended to be treated any differently than other 
copyrighted works.195 However, a casual examination of the statute suggests 
otherwise.196 Responding the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Congress 
created a special provision just for sound recordings where it laid out the 
limits of the exclusive rights with respect to sound recordings.197 The 
relevant limitation, confined in Section 114(b), states that the exclusive 
rights to reproduce and prepare derivative works of the owner of a 
copyrighted sound recording do not extend to another recording that 
                                                                                                                                      
 191. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 192. See supra Part II.A.  
 193. See supra Part II.B.  
 194. See supra Part II.B.  
 195. See e.g., VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[Section 
102] treats sound recordings identically to all other types of protected works; nothing in the 
text suggests differential treatment, for any purpose, of sound recordings compared to, say, 
literary works.”). 
 196. See supra Part II.B. 
 197. See generally 17 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
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consists entirely of independent sounds.198 That’s it. The rights stop there, at 
the line where another recording consists entirely of independent sounds. 
The very nature of an exclusive right implies that it extends all the way up to 
that point.  
So, why did the Ninth Circuit reject this interpretation? To borrow the 
words from Judge Silverman’s dissent, “[W]hat is the Sixth Circuit’s radical 
holding in [Bridgeport] that the [Ninth Circuit] finds so distasteful?”199 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this reading of the statute based on numerous 
reasons, none of which stem from the text of the statute. The holding is 
based upon a treatise,200 dicta from one of its own cases,201 formal principles 
of logic,202 the legislative history,203 and precedent established well before the 
enactment of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 and the Copyright Act of 
1976.204  
Regardless of such extrinsic considerations, the text reveals that Congress 
did not intend to create, or maintain, a de minimis exception for 
infringements of copyrighted sound recordings. The Ninth Circuit 
misinterpreted the plain text of the statute to achieve what it deemed to a 
better result. While the Ninth Circuit may disagree with the statute, it does 
not have the power to change it.  
2. Formal Principles of Logic  
One of the Ninth Circuit’s more subtle errors was its reliance upon the 
formal principles of logic.205 Using logic to justify an assertion obviously has 
a certain charm, because, honestly, who can argue with logic? The logical 
argument, however, is misplaced.206 Interpreting a statute is supposed to be 
                                                                                                                                      
 198. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 199. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 888 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, J. 
dissenting).  
 200. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 880 (majority opinion). 
 201. Id. at 881 (“Indeed, we stated in dictum in Newton that the [de minimis doctrine] 
applies throughout the law of copyright, including cases of music sampling.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 202. Id. at 884-85.  
 203. Id. at 883-84. This, admittedly, is the Ninth Circuit’s strongest argument for its 
interpretation of the statute.  
 204. Id. at 880-81.  
 205. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884-85. 
 206. In addition to contradicting the purpose of entire statute, characterizing an 
argument (or, in this case, an interpretation) as a “logical fallacy” does not automatically 
render the conclusion false or otherwise unacceptable. For example, Professor Rice states,  
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an exercise to determine the intent of the legislature.207 Using the formal 
principles of logic presupposes that Congress wrote the statute in 
accordance with these principles, but that presupposition is not bulletproof. 
The Ninth Circuit stated that  
[The Sixth Circuit] inferred from the fact that “exclusive rights . . 
. do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound 
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of 
other sounds,” the conclusion that exclusive rights do extend to 
the making of another sound recording that does not consist 
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds. . . . A 
statement that rights do not extend to a particular circumstance 
does not automatically mean that the rights extend to all other 
circumstances. In logical terms, it is a fallacy to infer the inverse 
of a conditional from the conditional.  
For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has rained, 
then the grass is not dry.” It does not necessarily follow that “if it 
has not rained, then the grass is dry.” Someone may have watered 
the lawn, for instance. . . . The first if-then statement does not tell 
us anything about the condition of the grass if it has not rained. 
Accordingly, even though it is true that, “if the recording consists 
entirely of independent sounds, then the copyright does not 
extend to it,” that statement does not necessarily mean that “if 
the recording does not consist entirely of independent sounds, 
then copyright does extend to it.”208 
If the formal principles of logic are applied to this provision in isolation, 
then the Ninth Circuit’s assertion is entirely true. However, these principles 
are not the rule of thumb for interpreting statutes. A reading of the text of 
the entire statute shows that applying these principles runs counter to the 
purpose of the statute.  
                                                                                                                                      
[T]he impact of the logical fallacy has its limits. While the fallacy is a powerful 
tool for exposing and diffusing the influence of an illogical argument, it does 
not necessarily invalidate the conclusion. Instead, it only invalidates the form of 
the argument purporting to support the conclusion. . . . If an argument’s 
structure is logically invalid, the result is that the argument cannot be used to 
support the truth of the conclusion. Another, logically sound, argument might 
still be crafted to support the conclusion. 
Stephen M. Rice, Conspicuous Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent as 
a Litigation Tool, 14 BARRY L. REV. 1, 22 (2010). 
 207. See EIG, supra note 183, at 3.  
 208. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884-85 (internal citations omitted). 
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Because these rights are exclusive, having been characterized as such by 
Congress,209 except for the stated limitations,210 the logical argument 
opposes the clear purpose of the statute. Stated differently, the very nature 
of an exclusive right implies that the copyright owner retains the sole right 
to reproduce, etc., up until the new sound recording “consists entirely of an 
independent fixation of other sounds.”211 Therefore, by the language of the 
statute, Section 114 protects everything less than a completely new sound 
recording consisting of entirely independent sounds.  
In addition, using principles of logic has often been repudiated.212 Judge 
Richard Posner, for instance, stated that  
[F]or there can be nothing very impressive about the fact that 
lawyers and judges, like everyone else, employ simple syllogisms. 
. . . For this reason, and in light of earlier discussion in this 
article, it should come as no surprise that the way in which 
lawyers actually “reason by analogy” is often, and misleadingly, 
syllogistic (technically, enthymematic).213  
Posner further expressed that “[i]nsofar as judges and lawyers do use logic, 
it is the simplest methods of logic they use.”214 In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s 
reliance on the formal principles of logic lacks persuasion because it only 
serves as an extrinsic canon of interpretation with the ability to mislead and, 
in this instance, actually runs counter to the purpose of the statute.  
                                                                                                                                      
 209. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 210. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-154).  
 211. Id.  
 212. See In re Freedom Grp, Inc. 50 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is a nice, tidy, 
‘logical’ argument but so manifestly contrary to the purpose of the statute as to incite grave 
doubts, at least in judges who are not in thrall to the syllogistic style of legal reasoning.”) 
 213. Id. at 844. Judge Posner continued by providing an example of how reasoning by 
analogy may be misleading, stating that 
The property lawyer who says that oil and gas should be analogized to rabbits 
or deer or other wild animals is really saying that the rule on wild animals (“the 
rule of capture”) is an instance of a more general rule that subsumes oil and gas: 
namely the rule that there are no possessory property rights in fugitive 
resources. The problem is then to justify the general rule, which cannot be done 
syllogistically or by analogies.  
Id.  
 214. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 835 
(1988).  
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B. Utilitarianism and Economics  
Although utilitarianism—the primary justification for copyright 
protection215—is a “philosophical and economic doctrine,”216 this Note will 
only examine the economic aspect.217 In order to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts”218 some level of protection is required, because if 
intellectual “property is made available to any and all upon creation, there is 
no incentive for creators to create. For example, if songwriters cannot profit 
from their ability to pen that platinum ballad, they are less likely to even put 
the pen to paper.”219  
As stated by the Sixth Circuit, the purpose of copyright protection is “to 
strike a balance between protecting original works and stifling further 
creativity.”220 An economic analysis, however, encompasses more than the 
balancing act required by the trade-off analysis; it requires an additional 
cost-benefit analysis. “Property rights confer two types of economic benefit, 
static and dynamic.”221 Static benefits, for example, include the right to 
exclude.222 Dynamic benefits, on the other hand, enable owners to reap 
where they have sown.223 Conversely, there are costs that accompany these 
benefits. The cost of creating an original expressive work—one that qualifies 
for copyright protection—has two components.224 First, there is the cost of 
                                                                                                                                      
 215. See supra Part II.A.  
 216. Utilitarianism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 217. An in-depth study into all the complexities of economics is beyond the purview of 
this Note. The purpose of this Section of the Note is to provide an elementary analysis and 
examination of some of the economic factors implicated through de minimis sampling of 
copyrighted sound recordings.  
 218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 219. Ryan C. Grelecki, Comment, Can Law and Economics Bring the Funk … or 
Efficiency?: A Law and Economics Analysis of Digital Sampling, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 311 
(2005). For another example, consider that   
Without [the prospect to reap what one has sown] the incentive to sow is 
diminished. To take an example from intellectual property, a firm is less likely 
to expend resources on developing a new product if competing firms that have 
not borne the expense of development can duplicate the product and produce it 
at the same marginal cost as the innovator . . . . 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).  
 220. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 221. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 219, at 12. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 13.  
 224. Id. at 37.  
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creating the work (a fixed cost) and second, there is the cost of reproducing 
copies (a variable cost).225 
Allowing others to sample copyrighted sound recordings deprives the 
owner of both economic benefits. There is no longer a full-fledged right to 
exclude. There will be an uncertain level of appropriation allowed before 
the right to exclude will be enforced by the courts, and this level of 
uncertainty creates an additional cost. Furthermore, sampling, by its very 
nature, allows the sampler to reap what another has sown, depriving the 
owner of this benefit. Although the owner is not completely deprived of the 
benefit—due to the inherent differences between intellectual property and 
other types of personal property (for example, a car)—there will be some 
level of benefit obtained by the sampler at the expense of the owner. 
Moreover, allowing sampling at any level allows the sampler to derive a 
benefit without any cost of creation, although there may be some inherent 
cost in the manner used to obtain the sample.  
Allowing de minimis copying, however, adds another variable cost to 
both the owner and the sampler, and it is an uncertain cost: the cost of 
litigation. The owner must assume the cost to prosecute the claim and the 
sampler must assume the cost to defend against the claim. Thus, allowing 
de minimis copying increases the potential costs involved, while decreasing 
the benefits. That is not to say that all copyright infringement actions (for 
example, musical compositions) should eliminate the de minimis exception, 
but sampling sound recordings is fundamentally different than any other 
type of copyright infringement.226 
While vesting private ownership in intellectual property may create 
holdouts—i.e., owners who refuse to grant a license to third parties—the 
dilemma is mitigated by the fact that holding out is, in nearly every case, not 
economically efficient.227 This is because the rights or benefits of copyright 
protection are transferable and, in most cases, must be transferred in order 
to maximize the profit. Nevertheless, “[t]he reality of the music industry is 
that digital sampling is cheaper and easier . . . . If the participants in the 
                                                                                                                                      
 225. Id.  
 226. The Sixth Circuit provides an unambiguous explanation of how sampling differs 
from other types.  
[S]ampling is never accidental. It is not like the case of a composer who has a 
melody in his head, perhaps not even realizing that the reason he hears this 
melody is that it is the work of another which he had heard before. When you 
sample a sound recording you know you are taking another’s work product.  
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 227. Grelecki, supra note 219, at 313 (“Most folks have figured out that keeping these 
copyrights to themselves is not the most financially sound decision.”). 
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market act rationally, they will sample.”228 The incentive to sample may also 
be exacerbated by the fact that the sampler may not have the ability to 
recreate the sampled material. Some may urge that this unreasonably tips 
the scale towards unduly stifling creativity. Economics, however, suggests 
otherwise. This would-be sampler—who has an idea of how to incorporate 
a sample into a new, presently profitable creation—will be forced to enter 
the market place in order to produce the new creation. Forcing would-be 
samplers into the market alleviates the problem that sampling “poses the 
greatest danger to the musical profession,” because the musician is no 
longer being replaced with himself.229  Therefore, when the economic 
considerations are taken into account, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation is 
the most economically efficient response to whether there should be a de 
minimis exception for digitally sampling copyrighted sound recordings.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As technology advances, statutory copyright protection endeavors to 
keep up. Congress sought to alleviate some of the foreseeable problems of 
technological advances by enacting the Copyright Act of 1976,230 but despite 
its best efforts, disputes remain. The Founders wisely vested the ability to 
control copyright protection in the federal government so that the 
protection afforded to those who create original works of authorship fixed 
in a tangible medium would enjoy the same protection throughout the 
country.231  
As of June 2, 2016, however, an irresoluble circuit split surfaced as to 
whether a de minimis exception applies to infringement claims premised 
upon the digital sampling of copyrighted sound recordings.232 In 2005, the 
Sixth Circuit established a bright-line rule whereby any sampling was per se 
infringement.233 In 2016, when confronted with the same issue, the Ninth 
                                                                                                                                      
 228. Id. at 327. The author of this article goes on further to state, 
If the probability of getting caught and having to pay a judgment or fine, or 
having to pay a license, or having to just stop using a sample altogether does 
not decrease the benefit gained by the ease of digital sampling, artists will act 
rationally and continue to sample without first seeking consent.  
Id. at 327-28.  
 229. Abramson, supra note 59, at 1668.  
 230. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, October 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541.  
 231. Crum, supra note 5, at 949-50. 
 232. Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) 
with VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 233. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Circuit declined to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach and held that a de 
minimis exception applies.234  
This circuit split is unwarranted. After examining the text of the relevant 
statutes and following the general guidelines on determining congressional 
intent, it becomes clear that the Sixth Circuit adopted the accurate 
approach.235 Furthermore, copyright protection is based upon a utilitarian 
theory, encompassing philosophy and economics.236 An economic analysis 
illustrates that the utilitarian goal of copyright protection is best served 
through the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation.237 Nevertheless, a circuit split 
remains. Because of the sharp split between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 
the ultimate determination will be left to either the Supreme Court of the 
United States or Congress. Either way, this split must be resolved in order 
to ensure uniformity and consistency in the application of the laws 
throughout the United States.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
 234. VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884. 
 235. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 236. Utilitarianism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 237. See supra Part IV.B.  
